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Objective. To study how changes in law shape the public health system.
Data Sources. State newborn screening laws and the National Newborn Screening
and Genetics Resource Center (NNSGRC).
Study Design. A time-series, quasi-experimental design spanning the years 1990–2006
for all states and the District of Columbia was conducted. Analysis proceeded using a
multinomial logit with a dependent variable of whether agencies lagged behind, were on
target with, or led their newborn screening law. Explanatory variables of three different
types of limitations on agency discretion plus relevant controls were included in the model.
Data Collection. State laws were coded for three types of discretion: whether an agency
can choose a state’s newborn screening panel conditions, whether an agency can charge
and change newborn screening fees, and whether the agency can define their own new-
born screening criteria. Each state’s newborn screening law for each year in the dataset
was coded with respect to the mandated number of conditions on a panel and compared
with the NNSGRC dataset of actual newborn screening implemented in the state.
Principal Findings. States that lack condition discretion have 6.02 greater odds of
lagging behind newborn screening law, but the presence of criteria discretion results in
7.50 higher odds of lagging behind the law. Condition discretion and fiscal discretion are
associated with successful implementation. The presence of criteria discretion is a
barrier for successful implementation.
Conclusions. Agency discretion can both hinder and facilitate program implemen-
tation. Thus, type of discretion determines implementation.
Key Words. Policy, screening, discretion, implementation, service delivery
States enact laws that set forth the contours of state public health department
authority, including what regulations agencies can promulgate. Yet practitio-
ners who work in these public health departments may miss opportunities for
strategic policy development because they do not consider nuances of their
power. Agency authority refers to the power that a state public health
department has to interpret and implement state policy through their actions.
Legislation thus provides the context for the operation of the public health
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system (Wing 2003; Turnock 2004), but the specific ways in which this legal
framework shapes public health practice remain understudied.
One public health program, newborn screening, has changed dramat-
ically in the past decade demonstrating how changes in state legislation and
agency authority influence the delivery of a public health service. Newborn
screening, which entails testing an infant just after birth for certain disorders, is
one of the largest public health programs in the United States and each state
has newborn screening legislation (Mitka 2000; Therrell et al. 2006). A new-
born screening panel is the list of disorders that a state screens. States differ in
the number of conditions they include on their panels. This variation in the
structure of newborn screening panels and authorizing legislation across states
and over time provides a case study to assess the ways in which legislative
context influences the operation of public health programs. Specifically, this
project aims to understand how agency authority influences the implemen-
tation of panel changes for state newborn screening programs. Results from
this study provide a template for understanding how aspects of authority help
or hinder other public health programs.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Public health agency authority is formally determined by the discretion
granted in authorizing statutes. Agency discretion is defined as the freedom to
make choices while performing the duties of an office (Vaughn and Otenyo
2006). This freedom allows practitioners to apply their expertise to a problem
at hand. If an agency is given discretion, the resulting outcomes may be very
different from those preferred by the elected legislature. From the legislature’s
perspective, there is a tradeoff between capitalizing on the expertise of an
agency and controlling policy outcomes. From the agency’s perspective, dis-
cretion can be a double-edged sword——it may offer the freedom to use knowl-
edge but also increase an agency’s accountability.
Legislators modify discretion by writing laws with language that limits
agency authority (Huber and Shipan 2002). At least three types of restrictions
on discretion exist: limits on practitioner judgment, specific criteria for action,
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and fiscal constraints (Kerwin 2003). Limiting judgment means that practitio-
ners cannot use their expertise to change programs——the legislature must
make those decisions. For instance, some legislatures specifically set the new-
born screening panel for the state. Any changes to the panel must be made by
the legislature, not by the agency. This constraint differs from restricting
agency discretion through setting criteria for action.
When a legislature sets program criteria, it sets the boundaries of a program.
In newborn screening, this is when a legislature specifically defines newborn
screening, for example, as testing for disorders that cause mental retardation and
are treatable. Some legislatures may choose to set criteria in legislation but afford
practitioners the discretion to use their judgment to change a program within
those boundaries. A newborn screening agency, in this instance, would be able to
change the disorders included on their panel, but only in accordance with the
criteria for newborn screening provided by the legislature. Finally, fiscal resources
are a straightforward check on discretion. When an agency receives funding
through the legislative process, there can be delays, decreases in allotments, etc.
An agency with other few restrictions can be limited through fiscal means.
Public health practitioners seek discretion to deal with unforeseen circum-
stances, the heterogeneity of individuals, and evolving science and technology
(Lipsky 1980; Shumavon and Hibbeln 1986; Gostin 2000). Restricting agency
discretion reduces practitioners’ ability to be flexible as they implement their
programs and increases barriers for implementing future changes. Less discretion
is hypothesized to be associated with difficulties in program implementation.
This study seeks to understand how discretion relates to policy imple-
mentation.
 Hypothesis 1 is that states with the discretion to specify their panel
disorders (condition discretion) are expected to have fewer imple-
mentation difficulties than states without this discretion. A public
health agency with condition discretion can use its expertise to tailor
its state’s panel according to evolving science and technology and
their population.
 Hypothesis 2 is that states with fiscal discretion are less likely to have
problems implementing the conditions mandated than those states
that lack fiscal autonomy. In newborn screening, fiscal discretion
translates into the ability to increase fees charged to hospitals
and other entities for newborn screening. Agencies with this type
of control over their fiscal resources have one less barrier for
implementation.
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 Hypothesis 3 is that criteria discretion is associated with a lower
likelihood of implementation difficulties. Agency-level officials can
utilize their own criteria in cases where a state statute does not require
that a disease fulfill certain criteria before addition to the newborn
screening panel.
Aside from bureaucratic discretion, there are other sources of variation
in the likelihood that a state faces implementation difficulties. The age of a
state’s legislation and laboratory type are expected to be negatively associated
with implementation problems. The number of policy changes a state has
experienced, the number of years since 1990, the number of births (which
directly affects the number of specimens analyzed in the state), and the advent
of a new technology called tandem mass spectrometry are expected to in-
crease the likelihood that a state has difficulties with implementation. In par-
ticular, this technological advance allowed states to screen new conditions as
well as multiple disorders on the same sample. After tandem mass spectro-
metry, legislatures had the opportunity to incorporate higher numbers of
conditions into their statutes than before the technology became available.
METHODS
To evaluate the influence of agency discretion on a state’s implementation
of newborn screening panels, this study utilizes newborn screening programs
as the unit of observation. The dependent variable is whether a state expe-
riences problems with implementation. Implementation difficulties are con-
ceptualized as a state that implements a smaller panel than that dictated by law
(the agency lags behind the law). A lag means that a state screens fewer con-
ditions in practice than its law stipulates (and a leading state screens for more).
The dependent variable of implementation is coded as  1 (lag), 0 (screens for
exactly the same number defined), and 11 (lead). The project employs a time-
series, quasi-experimental design spanning the years of 1990 through 2006 for
all 50 states and the District of Columbia (yielding 867 total state-years).
Annual observations of newborn screening panels for each state were
obtained from self-reported data collected by the National Newborn Screen-
ing and Genetics Resource Center (NNSGRC). In addition, archival review
of each state’s laws over the time span of the study was conducted. Each law
was coded for the presence or absence (1, 0) of condition discretion, fiscal
discretion, and criteria discretion. For instance, a law that specifically dictated
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the disorders that a state should screen in their panel was coded as lacking (a
code of 0) condition discretion and a law that provided the public health
agency with the authority to pick the disorders on their panel was coded as
having (a code of 1) condition discretion. These three types of discretion are
the main explanatory variables.
This project examined all 50 states from 1990 to 2006 and identified all
three limits on discretion in state newborn screening statutes (see Table 1). A
statute that lacks all three constraints and contains broad agency authority is
Iowa’s 2005 statute, where the state health department sets the rules by which
the program operates. In comparison, Kentucky limits how new conditions
are added to their panel, Colorado’s statute details the exact criteria the board
of health must use to change their panel, and Florida’s statute stipulates details
of the program’s fiscal arrangements.
The remaining variables in the empirical model include controls for
policy change, type of laboratory, number of births, age of the law, time, and





All newborns born in this state shall be screened for congenital and
inherited disorders in accordance with rules adopted by the
department. Iowa Code Annotated, 2005
Condition constraint The listing of tests for heritable disorders may be revised to include
conditions as deemed appropriate by the cabinet based on the
recommendations of the American College of Medical Genetics.
Title XVIII Public Health, Chapter 215.155, Kentucky Revised
Statutes Annotated, 2006
Criteria constraint The board of health shall use the following criteria to determine
whether or not to test infants for conditions which are not
specifically enumerated in this subsection: (I) The condition for
which the test is designed presents a significant danger to the health
of the infant or his family and is amenable to treatment; (II) The
incidence of the condition is sufficiently high to warrant screening;
(III) The test meets commonly accepted clinical standards of
reliability . . . ; (IV) The cost-benefit consequences of screening are
acceptable . . . Title 25, Part 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1998
Fiscal constraint The [Department of Health shall] have the authority to charge and
collect fees for the administration of the newborn screening
program . . . as follows: 1. A fee not to exceed $15 will be charged
for each live birth . . . 2. As part of the department’s legislative
budget request . . . the department shall submit . . . the annual
costs of the uniform testing and reporting . . . Florida Annotated
Statutes, 2007
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technological change. The number of policy changes for the newborn screen-
ing program in a state (Change) was determined by the number of policy
changes from program initiation year to the time of the analysis divided by the
total number of years available for a policy change. The type of laboratory
(Lab) was coded 0 if the newborn screening laboratory is a public health
laboratory and 1 otherwise (includes academic and private laboratories). Each
state’s number of births (Birth) was obtained from the National Vital Statistics
System’s Birth data collected by NNSGRC. A review of legislative history for
each state’s specific statutes determined the age of a state’s newest legislation in
years (Age) and an indicator variable (YRS90) was added to control for the
influence of time on the outcomes of interest.
In addition, a crucial variable to include as a control in this analysis is a
specific newborn screening technological advance, tandem mass spectrome-
try. Tandem mass spectrometry was developed externally to state newborn
screening programs (an exogenous shock). Since North Carolina began the
first public health laboratory-based tandem mass spectrometry operation in
1999, its use in newborn screening has steadily increased over time (Frazier
et al. 2006). Tandem mass spectrometry advanced the field of newborn
screening by changing the manner in which screening was accomplished.
Public health agencies with tandem mass spectrometry could screen for
different conditions and numerous disorders on the same sample. For this
study, then, it is important to take this factor into account in the analyses. A
dummy variable operationalized this technology and split the sample between
the years 1990–1998 and 1999–2006 (coded 0 and 1 in that order).1
Because of the nature of the data collected (repeated observations on states
for each year), a panel model was constructed using the unit of analysis as the
state-year. Each state’s data on whether they experience implementation diffi-
culties, the types of discretion present in the newborn screening law, and the
various control variables were collected for each year in the dataset. The like-
lihood of implementation problems was modeled as a function of the three types
of discretion with controls. Individual measures of the types of bureaucratic
discretion were utilized. A multinomial logit model was used and followed the
equation: Probability of lagging or leading (compared with being on target
with state law) 5 b1Conditioni,t 11b2Fiscali,t 11b3Criteriai,t 11b4Changei,t,1
b5Labi,t1b6Agei,t1b7Birthi,t1b8YRS90i,t1b9MSMSi,t1ei using the trichotomous
dependent variable (with lagging [ 1], being on target with [0], or leading [11]
a state’s law), where i refers to the state, and t the year. Estimation
was conducted using Stata Version 10.0 (Stata Corp, 2007), with robust stan-
dard errors.2
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics indicate that the size of newborn screening panels
increased from 1990 to 2006. The average number of conditions analyzed
on newborn screening panels increased from 5 disorders in 1990 to 31 dis-
orders in 2006. Of the 867 state-years in the full data set, 46 were years when
states screened for fewer conditions than their mandate stipulated, 120 were
state-years exactly on target with the mandated number of conditions, and 701
were years when states screened for more conditions than mandated by their
newborn screening law.
Multivariate analyses confirm the importance of discretion on the im-
plementation of newborn screening policy changes. In Table 2, the discretion
variables are estimated as the predictors of whether a state lags behind, is on
target with, or leads the number of conditions dictated by the state legislature.
Model 1 analyzes the entire sample of state-years, model 2 considers those
years before tandem mass spectrometry, and model 3 focuses on the years
after tandem mass spectrometry. All coefficients are reported, but only the-
oretically and statistically significant findings are discussed.
As expected by hypothesis 1, state health departments that are not given
the authority to name their own newborn screening panel are more likely to lag
behind their state’s newborn screening law. In the full model, the odds of
lagging compared with being on target with a state’s law are 6.02 times as great
for agencies that lack condition discretion (1/exp( 1.796)). There are two
reasons for this result. First, state agencies that have this autonomy can change
their panel as they gain relevant knowledge, not in response to their legislature’s
demands. The second possibility is that state agencies that lack autonomy to use
professional judgment have less incentive to acquire or refine their expertise.
Surprisingly, condition discretion and criteria discretion have opposing
influences on whether a state implements screening for fewer conditions
than dictated by its law. States with criteria discretion have 7.50 higher odds
of lagging behind compared with being on target with their mandate
(exp(2.015)). In contrast to hypothesis 3, the autonomy to set program
criteria is a barrier for successful implementation. This result may be due to the
underutilization of agency authority or that a lack of guidelines results in
programmatic delay for expansions.
In model 1, the types of discretion do not appear to significantly predict
whether a state leads its mandate in comparison with being on target with its
law. Instead, the age of the newborn screening legislation, time, laboratory
type, and change history are the influential explanators. For instance, the odds
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of a state implementing more conditions than state law dictates (leading) in-
crease by 6 percent with each year that the newborn screening legislation goes
without amendment and the odds of leading are higher for states using public
health laboratories.
The results for hypothesis 2, that fiscal discretion decreases the likeli-
hood that a state would lag behind state law, in model 1 are not statistically
significant. Models 2 and 3 split the sample due to the exogenous shock of the
advent of tandem mass spectrometry.3 A comparison of the early and later
years of newborn screening reveals interesting differences in the influence of
Table 2: Implementation and Discretion
Explanatory and Control Variables





Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Probability of lagging behind mandate
Condition discretion present  1.796 (0.734)n 1.299 (1.461)  1.340 (0.937)
Criteria discretion present 2.015 (0.626)nnn 1.072 (0.625)^ 1.868 (0.776)n
Fiscal discretion present 0.022 (0.499)  0.383 (1.219)  1.267 (0.691)^
Age of legislation  0.178 (0.083)n  0.549 (0.238)n  0.119 (0.077)
Years since 1990  0.087 (0.087)  0.323 (0.164)n 0.176 (0.128)
Number of births 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Laboratory type  2.693 (0.946)nn  34.889 (0.7338)w,nnnn  2.100 (1.113)^
Change history 0.058 (0.066) 0.471 (0.341)  0.019 (0.078)
MS/MS 2.937 (0.861)nnn —— ——
Constant  0.997 (0.569)^  1.533 (1.597)  0.768 (1.541)
Probability of leading mandate
Condition discretion present  0.385 (0.349)  0.941 (0.506)^ 0.601 (0.593)
Criteria discretion present 0.294 (0.257) 0.562 (0.343)^ 0.032 (0.447)
Fiscal discretion present  0.049 (0.312) 0.659 (0.450)  1.454 (0.515)nn
Age of legislation 0.058 (0.016)nnnn 0.058 (0.021)nn 0.071 (0.026)nn
Years since 1990 0.151 (0.044)nnn 0.109 (0.054)n 0.412 (0.088)nnnn
Number of births 0.000 (0.000)n 0.000 (0.000)n 0.000 (0.000)^
Laboratory type  1.795 (0.260)nnnn  2.312 (0.356)nnnn  1.169 (0.528)n
Change history  0.098 (0.040)n  0.159 (0.070)n  0.144 (0.059)n
MS/MS  0.086 (0.501) —— ——
Constant 1.176 (0.299)nnnn 1.468 (0.371)nnnn  1.903 (1.155)^
N 867 459 408
Wald chi square (DF) 174.89 (18)nnnn 5805.33 (16)nnnn 80.06 (16)nnnn
Notes. Dependent variable 5  1, 0, 11 lagging, on target with, leading state mandated number of
conditions on a newborn screening panel. Baseline category 5 on target with mandate, coded as 0.
^po.10, npo.05, nnpo.01, nnnpo.001, nnnnpo.0001.
wThe coefficient on laboratory type in model 2 is due to the presence of 11 public health laboratories
and 0 nonpublic health laboratories before the advent of MS/MS technology for those states that lag
behind the mandate. The covariate remains in the model due to the importance of laboratory type
for leading states in comparison with the baseline of being on target with the mandate.
1904 HSR: Health Services Research 44:5, Part II (October 2009)
fiscal discretion. Before the advent of tandem mass spectrometry technology,
the coefficient on fiscal discretion does not reach significance. After tandem
mass spectrometry, agencies with fiscal discretion are both less likely to lag
behind and less likely to lead in comparison with being on target with their
mandate. This result indicates that financial autonomy helps programs
successfully implement legislative changes but does not lead to agencies over-
reaching their legislature.
DISCUSSION
This project considers how different types of public health agency discretion
influence implementation of newborn screening state laws. The results reveal
that when public health agencies have the discretion to name their own panel of
newborn screening conditions and charge their own fees, they are less likely to
lag behind the state’s newborn screening law. The presence of criteria discretion,
on the other hand, increases the probability that a state will lag behind its law.
This study goes beyond the traditional finding that discretion is impor-
tant for public health agencies. Constraining discretion can be both beneficial
and harmful to successful implementation. For instance, restricting the
autonomy of agencies by establishing criteria for action aids program imple-
mentation. This constraint provides specific boundaries within which prac-
titioners can function. Alternatively, the lack of discretion to use practitioner
judgment (i.e., condition discretion) and fiscal limitations are a barrier for
successful implementation. The specific constraints chosen by a legislature are
crucial to implementing newborn screening panel changes. Practitioners who
lack the freedom to use their judgment in deciding their panel were sluggish to
react to new legislative changes, possibly due to the decreased incentive for
expertise. Agencies with condition discretion, though, are able to keep up with
scientific and technological change.
Using newborn screening as a case study, it is plausible that substantial
autonomy is beneficial for public health policies that require practitioner
knowledge. Agencies, though, should not be given free reign to implement
public health programs. Instead, discretion should be constrained in ways that
encourage efficient, accountable action——by providing clear criteria for pro-
grams. In this case, agencies with the discretion to set their own criteria were
more likely to lag behind their state’s newborn screening laws. Gostin asserts
that the ‘‘clear criteria for the exercise of public health powers’’ is necessary for
‘‘public health work’’ (2000, p. 322). Whether programs that lacked criteria
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discretion were underutilizing their authority or fumbling without guidance
was not assessed in this study and is in need of further study.
Policy makers must consider the distinction between different con-
straints on agency discretion. Conventional wisdom in politics is that legis-
lators should control agencies by limiting their discretion. It may be possible to
constrain agencies by limiting only certain aspects of their discretion. Using
newborn screening as an example, the language in a policy can define criteria
for action but allow for expert choice in other aspects of a program.
Public health practitioners need to develop a better awareness of and
appropriately utilize the boundaries of their discretionary authority. For in-
stance, if a program’s authorizing statute does not provide specific criteria for a
program, the agency should work toward developing these in a public forum,
either through legislative advocacy or through a public consensus-building pro-
cess. In addition, if state statutes constrain professional judgment, practitioners
should work with legislative staff to propose new language that increases dis-
cretion related to expertise but sets specific limits on the exercise of this authority.
In sum, practitioners need to be directly involved in policy making by providing
information about downstream implications of various language choices.
This study only scratches the surface of public health law’s importance
for public health practice and has limitations. For instance, newborn screening
is a specific program within state public health agencies. This focus offers the
benefit of following a set of changing statutes over time, but it does not con-
sider how overlapping and inconsistent laws influence public health practice.
Additional studies outside of newborn screening should consider the influence
of different types of discretion of program structures and outcomes. Further-
more, this study does not consider the influence of discretion and expansion in
newborn screening on population health outcomes. Recent scholars have
highlighted concerns about whether screening for more disorders actually
improves population health (Botkin et al. 2006; Tarini, Christakis, and Welch
2006; Tarini 2007). As newborn screening programs evolve, a careful con-
sideration of the likelihood and impact of false positives, the availability of
resources for follow-up and support, and knowledge about the natural history
of tested disorders must be undertaken (Botkin et al. 2006; Tarini 2007).
CONCLUSIONS
The structure of agency discretion is a crucial factor for public health practice.
Understanding the intersection of implementation, discretion, and technology
is important for policy makers and practitioners.
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NOTES
1. The robustness of the results to this choice was checked, and the significance and
substantive value of the discretion variables increases with later dates.
2. Panel logit models and models with clustering for state and year were analyzed
with the same substantive results.
3. Interactions of the theoretical variables of interest with the tandem mass spect-
rometry variable yielded similar substantive results.
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